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PLAYER RESTRAINTS AND COMPETITION
LAW THROUGHOUT THE WORLD
STEPHEN

F. Ross*

This article reviews agreements among clubs participating in league sports
in many countries throughout the world that limit competition for the services
of players. Under the English common law (which governs in most of the
British commonwealth), the competition law provisions of the European
Union's governing treaty, the American Sherman Act, and the Canadian
Competition Act, the governing standard is quite similar. Player restraints can
only be justified if they are related to a legitimate purpose, which is usually
defined as one that demonstrably improves the consumer appeal for the
sporting competition. Moreover, and significantly, player restraints must be
reasonably necessary to achieve the demonstrated purpose; in short, overbroad
restraints are not consistent with competition law.
Competition law provides a meaningful, effective, and under-utilized
constraint on the monopsony power of sports leagues. Although American
players must surmount an additional obstacle of waiving rights under labor
law, this obstacle is not present elsewhere. In all relevant jurisdictions,
sensible application of competition law principles is superior to a laissezfaire
approach or direct government regulation, and is less intrusive than a
restructuring of league sports to eliminate monopsony power.
I.

OVERVIEW: WHAT ARE PLAYER RESTRAINTS?

In most professional sports leagues around the world, participating clubs
compete among themselves to sign players, subject to rules imposed by the
league or agreed to among themselves.1 Rules imposed by leagues often
Professor of Law, University of Illinois. An earlier version of this paper was presented
at the
Marquette University National Sports Law Institute's Conference on International Sports Law &
Business. This Article, which focuses specifically on player restraints and is written for a legal
audience, in turn builds upon a prior work, Competition Law as a Constraint On Monopolistic
Exploitation by Sports Leagues and Clubs, 19 OXFORD REV. OF ECON. POL. 569 (2004).

1. Beyond the scope of this paper are the nuances involved within leagues with unusual
structures, such as Major League Soccer (clubs directly control league, but league centrally signs and
allocates players), Fraser v. Major League Soccer, L.L.C., 284 F.3d 47 (1st Cir. 2002), or the
Women's National Basketball Association (clubs indirectly control league with central labor control).
See Larry Lebowitz, Leagues are Forming as 'Single Entities' Where Decision and Profits are Shared
by All Owners, FT. LAUDERDALE SUN-SENTMNEL, Apr. 20, 1997, at IF.
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significantly restrain competition for players. These can include a reserve list,
whereby clubs will not bid for reserved players at the expiration of a contract;
the player must either re-sign with his prior employer or seek employment
elsewhere. Some players are on a restrictedlist, so that any club desiring their
services agrees to provide compensation to the former employer, or to allow
the former employer to match the best offer. Common among North
American and Australian leagues is a player draft, whereby amateurs or
veterans not under contract can only negotiate with the team that selects them;
teams usually select in reverse order. of finish from the prior season. In recent
years, several leagues have employed club salary caps, which prevent a club
from competing for players when its total payroll for players exceeds a
specified amount, or a more modest version of this restraint, a luxury tax on
payrolls that exceed a certain amount, thereby making it more expensive for
high-payroll teams to compete for the services of players. Some leagues also
employ individual player salary caps that limit the amount a player can
receive based on years of service within the league or his previous salary.
Three other common practices also can significantly affect the ability of
clubs to compete for player services. Rules by which clubs agree not to spend
more than a certain percentage of their own revenue on players, or agree to cut
payroll if debt is too high, can take profligate or poorly managed clubs out of
the bidding for players. North American leagues also employ roster limits and
waiver rules. In combination, these provisions limit the total number of major
league-quality players that any team can employ; and the existing contracts for
players in excess of that number must be offered for assignment, for a modest
fixed fee, to other teams (who may select in reverse order of their current
position in the standings). North American leagues also engage in another
practice that is often not seen as affecting player restraints - a ban on
significant cash sales. Because significant cash sales are banned, clubs
seeking a star player must either sign one of the few "free agents" (a player
whose contract has expired, and who is not subject to any of the
aforementioned restrictive rules) or arrange a trade with another club.
II.

THE COMPETITION PROBLEM: EXERCISE OF MONOPSONY POWER

The more restrictive of the afore-mentioned rules are prevalent where
clubs adhering to restraints do not face significant competition from others for
the services of players. Restraints are less prevalent where players have
credible options to play elsewhere. For example, although the top Italian
soccer league seriously considered imposing a salary cap, 2 it was not
2. BBC SPORT, Serie A Considers Salary Cap, Nov. 9, 2001, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/
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implemented. Such a plan would have been unfeasible because it was clear
that the top players would simply leave Serie A and play for clubs in other
European soccer leagues. However, soccer is the only league sport where
serious inter-league competition exists for the world's best players. The
revenue disparities between American baseball, basketball, and hockey
leagues and those in other countries where these sports are played are so great
that the option to play elsewhere is not a viable substitute. American and
Australian Rules Football are only played in those countries. While rugby has
major league professional clubs, most rugby federations require that players
seeking the income and prestige from participating in international rugby must
play for a domestic club, thus creating a huge disincentive for players to play
elsewhere.4 Thus, most clubs in league sports around the world are able to
exercise monopsony power over their players. 5
The most obvious and immediate effect of the imposition of player
restraints by clubs with monopsony power is lower salaries for players. Of
course, this restraint represents a significant transfer of wealth from players to
clubs. If the salary restraint is too severe, it may affect players' investment in
training, and thus hurt the quality of the sport. However, professional athletes'
next-best occupation usually pays so much below the salary commanded as an
athlete that this will not significantly affect the supply of players. Of greatest
concern to competition laws designed to promote efficiency and protect
consumers, however, is that these rules can often result in the inefficient
allocation of players among teams.6 Subject to important modifications to
protect competitive balance, in general, the optimal allocation of players

sport2/hi/football/europe/1647252.stm (last visited Oct. 6, 2004).
3. To determine monopoly or monopsony power, courts inquire as to those buyers or sellers who
are "reasonably interchangeable.., for the same purposes." United States v. E.I. duPont de Nemours
& Co., 351 U.S. 377, 395 (1956).
4. See, e.g., Ben Kimber, Larkham Turns His Back On Big Bucks To Stick With Australia,
SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, May 5, 2004, at 34 (rugby star declined huge salary increase to play for
English rugby club because signing with the club would disable him from playing for Australian
national rugby team). There are two codes of rugby, and in recent years there has been some modest
competition at the top level, for a few top players capable of excelling in either rugby league or rugby
union.

5. There are no relevant labor market restraints in cricket. The only level where the sport is
profitable is international competition, where players play for a country and thus no market exists for
competition in player services.
6. I have addressed this issue in detail in several other articles: Stephen F. Ross, Monopoly Sports
Leagues, 73 MINN. L. REV. 643 (1989); Stephen F. Ross, The Misunderstood Alliance Between
Sports Fans,Players, and the Antitrust Laws, 1997 U. ILL. L. REV. 519; Stephen F. Ross & Robert B.
Locke, Why Highly PaidAthletes Deserve More AntitrustProtection than OrdinaryFactory Workers,
33 ANTITRUST BULL. 641 (1997); Stephen F. Ross, The NHL Labour Dispute and the Common Law,
the Competition Act, and PublicPolicy, 37 U.B.C. L. REV. 343 (2004).
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among teams in a league will be to allow the market to place the players with
the teams that value them the most. Contrary to conventional wisdom, player
balance, by making it more difficult for
restraints often harm competitive
7
lousy teams to quickly improve.
III.

POLICY ALTERNATIVES TO ADDRESS ANTICOMPETITIVE RESTRAINTS

If monopsony power means that the normally self-correcting features of
economic markets are unlikely to constrain the exercise of economic power by
sports leagues and clubs, what policy alternatives are there? A variety of
approaches are possible, including laissez faire, ongoing government
regulation, or government intervention to restructure sports leagues to assure
the existence of multiple competing leagues in each sport. As detailed below,
each of these raises significant economic and/or political problems. Operating
through private and governmental enforcement of competition statutes and the
common law on restraint of trade, however, courts have had modest success in
ameliorating inefficient or exploitive abuses of power. More vigorous
enforcement through the courts offers an opportunity for greater protection of
the public interest.
A.

Laissez Faire

Some argue that government should simply stay out of this matter entirely;
the claim is that the potential harms are not significant enough to justify
intervention. Because some player restraints are justifiable (see below),
advocates of this view maintain that government agencies or courts have little
ability to distinguish between good and bad restraints, so they should not try.
This is especially so because of the superiority of private ordering of these
matters, in the context of collective bargaining8 between owners and players, if
the latter should wish to organize into a union.
Although monopolistic abuses in sport, to be sure, raise less of a societal
concern than when products essential to the economy are subject to output
restraints or inefficiencies, huge social welfare costs still exist. Absent legal
restrictions on employer conspiracies in labor markets, clubs will distort the
efficient allocation of players. Moreover, as evidenced by the record of Major
League Baseball (which historically enjoyed an exemption from competition
law regulation), employer monopsonies lead to significant industrial unrest in
the form of player strikes and lockouts as employers seek to maintain their
7. Ross, MisunderstoodAlliance, supra note 6.
8. See, e.g., Gary R. Roberts, The Casefor Baseball's Special Antitrust Immunity, 4 J. SPORTS

ECON. 302 (2003).
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power.
B.

Restructure the Industry

Where players can receive bids for their services from clubs in competing
leagues, the market can be relied upon to approach an efficient result. Where
inter-league competition exists, clubs can be expected to adopt the most
efficient player restraints. As long as leagues compete against each other for
player talent, there is little cause for concern about inefficient or exploitive
practices. A full discussion of this point is beyond the scope of this Article,
and is set forth in detail elsewhere. 9 Others have suggested this restructuring
is unworkable because competitive markets are non-sustainable.' ° Although
not an antitrust defense, sports fans might argue that a monopoly league is
socially desirable in order to produce monopoly profits that can be used to
subsidize grass roots development of the sport. While a restructuring has been
recently endorsed by prominent economists," implementation would face
significant hurdles. Either a legislature would have to be persuaded to adopt
specific legislation requiring restructuring, a daunting task given the lack of
historical success with competing leagues, 2 or a court would have to order
restructuring as a remedy for a suit for illegal monopolization or abuse of
dominant position.
The technical requirements 3 of these suits create
formidable, if not necessarily insuperable, obstacles.'
C. Direct Government Regulation
If we are prepared to accept a single dominant league in a sport, another
alternative is to establish an expert agency to approve any restraints to which
clubs may wish to agree. This approach is problematic for a number of
9. Ross, Monopoly Sports Leagues, supranote 6.
10. Roberts, supra note 8, at 313 n.4.
11. See, e.g., Roger G. Noll & Andrew Zimbalist, Sports, Jobs, and Taxes: The Real Connection,
in SPORTS, JOBS, AND TAXES 503 (Roger G. Noll & Andrew Zimbalist, eds., 1997); JAMES QUIRK &
RODNEY FORT, HARD BALL: THE ABUSE OF POWER IN PRO TEAM SPORTS 177 (1999); Walter

Adams & James W. Brock, Monopoly, Monopsony, and Vertical Collusion:Antitrust Policy and
ProfessionalSports, 42 ANTITRUST BULL. 721, 746 (1997).
12. For the argument that the failure of stable competing leagues in the United States is due to a
combination of monopolistic practices, exempted mergers, or business incompetence, rather than the
non-viability of competing leagues, see Ross, Monopoly Sports Leagues, supra note 6, at 717-23. For
a brief discussion of why competing leagues in Australian rugby failed, see Stephen F. Ross, Anticompetitive Aspects of Sports, 7 COMPETITION & CONSUMER L.J. 125, 135-38 (1999).
13. In the United States, for example, the plaintiff would have to establish that the defendant
league not only exercised monopoly power but had achieved its power through unlawful means. I
detail some of the obstacles to a Sherman Act divestiture in Antitrust Options to Redress
Anticompetitive Restraints and Monopolistic Practicesby ProfessionalSports Leagues, 52 CASE W.
L.J. 133 (2001).
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reasons. There are significant problems with identifying a broad "public
interest" separate from the marketplace. Moreover, there is a strong risk of
agency capture by special interests, most notably the clubs. Where, as in
North America, strong player unions exist, the potential for agency rules to
interfere with collective bargaining are significant, resulting in an increased
risk of industrial disruption.
D. Subject Leagues to Legal Challengesfor "Unreasonable"Restraints
Under Competition Law
The remaining and most promising option for constraining monopsony
power would be to subject agreements among the dominant league's clubs to a
standard of reasonableness. This standard requires that agreements which
appear to have anti-competitive effects must be justified as reasonably
necessary to achieve some legitimate welfare- or consumer-enhancing goal.
The standard evolved from the English common law of restraint of trade,
which remains applicable to sports law claims in countries including the
United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, Ireland, and India,
was further developed by judicial precedents interpreting the American
Sherman Act to incorporate common law concepts, and has now been
effectively adopted as the governing standard for applying, in the sports
context, Section 1 of the American Sherman Act, Section 48 of the Canadian
Competition Act, and Article 82 of the EU Treaty.
IV. THE COMMON STANDARDS OF COMPETITION LAW

A.

14

Common Law of Restraint of Trade

Although early common law decisions proscribed any labor market
restraints, by 1711 courts established that restraints were lawful if
reasonable. 15 The standard test was enunciated by the House of Lords in
Nordenfelt v. Maxim Nordenfelt Gun & Ammunition Co.; restraints were
lawful if
reasonable, that is, in reference to the interests of the parties concerned
and reasonable in reference to the interests of the public, so framed
and so guarded as to afford adequate protection to the party in whose
favour it is imposed, while at the same time it is in no way injurious to
14. This sub-part summarizes a detailed exposition of the application of the common law of
restraint of trade to sports league in my article, Ross, NHL Labour Dispute, supra note 6.
15. Mitchel v. Reynolds, (1711) 1 P.Wms. 181, [1558-1774] All E.R. 26,24 Eng. Rep. 347
(K.B.).
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the public.'
To be lawful, labor restraints must be justified by some employer interests
that courts recognized as legitimate. In making this determination, it is the
public interest that determines what private interests are legitimate,1 7 and
freedom from competition is never a legitimate interest.' 8 From 1711 to the
present, courts have been clear that restraints must be narrowly tailored to
protect legitimate interests.' 9 As applied to sports, courts almost always have
found restraints to be overbroad. As made clear by the New Zealand Court of
Appeal, restraints must be justified as legitimate in light of public interest
considerations that include consumer interests and individual freedom for
players.2 °
What makes sports leagues unique is the recognition of the legitimate
interest that clubs have in competitive balance, an interest that can justify
restraints impermissible in other industries. The pathmarking case is Eastham
v. Newcastle United Football Club,2 1 a challenge to a rule imposed by English
soccer authorities similar to baseball's reserve clause. Finding a real inequality
in bargaining power, Lord Wilberforce stated that the pervasive use of this
system by sports league employers justified careful judicial consideration of
whether the rules went "further than is reasonably necessary to protect their
legitimate interests." 22 Nonetheless, he acknowledged that, if richer teams
could acquire most of the better players, this would be "to the detriment of
the... whole., 23 Thus, the league had a special and legitimate interest in
maintaining the overall quality of the sport through competitive balance.
The burden that Eastham places on owners and leagues cannot be
overemphasized, however. Lord Wilberforce's opinion demands proof not
only that (a) richer teams would indeed be more active in signing free agents
than financially poorer clubs, but that (b) the free agents signed would be
better, thus directly harming competitive balance, and c) that this loss of
competitive balance would be "to the detriment of the ...whole." Thus, a
league must establish that a player restraint must actually help weaker teams;
proof of this proposition may be difficult because ordinarily free markets
ordinarily will allow players to move from overstocked talented teams to clubs

16. [1894] A.C. 535, 565, [1891-4] All E.R. 1 (H.L.).
17. J.D. HEYDON, THE RESTRAINT OF TRADE DOCTRINE 72 (2d ed. 1999).
18. Herbert Morris Ltd. v. Saxelby, [1916] A.C. 688, 702, [1916-17] All E.R. 305 (H.L.).
19. Eastham v. Newcastle United Football Club, [1964] Ch. 413, 438, [1963] 3 All E.R. 139,
148.
20. Blackler v. New Zealand Rugby Football League, [1968] N.Z.L.R. 547, 571 (C.A.).
21.[1964] Ch. 413, [1963] 3 All E.R. 139.
22. Id.at 438.
23. Id.at 431-32.
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with inferior rosters. In fact, restrained markets often rigidify dominance of
few top teams.
In addition to competitive balance, national sporting organizations have
leeway to impose restraints "reasonably necessary for the protection or the
organisation and administration of the game., 24 The court made clear,
however, that this goal must be weighed against impact on players and
deprivation to public of watching the highest quality sport possible.
Thus, the common law provides a meaningful restriction on the ability of
clubs with monopsony power to unjustifiably limit competition for players.
Because the common law is not preempted by statute in most Commonwealth
jurisdictions, it remains a vital policy alternative.25
B.

US. Law: Sherman Act

The literal wording of section 1 of the Sherman Act condemns every
agreement in restraint of trade.26 However, landmark decisions in United
28
27
States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. and Standard Oil Co. v. United States

established a non-literal reading of section 1 as barring only "unreasonable"
restraints. Addyston Pipe holds that restraints among competitors are
reasonable only when "ancillary to the main and lawful purpose of the contract
and necessary [to protect] the covenantee in the [enjoyment of the legitimate
fruits of the contract.]" 29 Applying these principles to sports, the Supreme
Court held in National CollegiateAthletic Ass'n v. Board of Regents30 that the
organization of a sports league is a "lawful" contract, but a restraint is
24. Greig v. Insole, [19781 3 All E.R. 449, 497 (Ch.).
25. Although common law restraint of trade claims are not preempted in the United States,
players challenging American sports league restraints are not likely to rely on the common law.
Traditionally, the common law in the United States is a question of state law (so there are really fifty
common laws), with each state's Supreme Court as final arbiter. Because player restraint rules must
be uniform throughout the country, the prospect of inconsistent determinations precludes the
application of the common law of any single state. See, e.g., Partee v. San Diego Chargers Football
Co., 668 P.2d 674 (Cal. 1983) (application of state law would unconstitutionally burden interstate
commerce). There is a novel argument that, just as the United States Supreme Court created a federal
common law for commercial relations with the federal government, the unique uniform needs of
sports leagues would justify the creation of a federal common law of restraint of trade for sports
leagues, with ultimate uniform review by the United States Supreme Court. However, absent any
meaningful substantive difference between a common law claim and a Sherman Act claim, players
are likely to pursue the latter and leave the former for academic speculation.
26. "Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of
trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal." 15
U.S.C. § 1 (2000).
27. 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), affd, 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
28. 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
29. 85 F. at 283.
30. 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
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unreasonable if it is shown that, as a result of the restraint, prices are higher,
output is lower, or output is unresponsive to consumer demand compared to
Courts have held that player restraints that
what "would otherwise be."'
affect stars and ordinary players alike are overbroad.32 In demonstrating that
restraints are necessary, these precedents suggest that, for example, the leagues
would have to demonstrate why revenue sharing is not a less restrictive
alternative means of achieving competitive balance.
The Sherman Act takes a narrower focus than the common law with
regard to permissible justifications: they must relate to a demonstration that
the restraint will promote competition or make the product more attractive to
consumers. Arguments seeking to justify a restraint as protecting the general
administration of the game, which might be acceptable under the common law,
will not be legitimate if the claim is reduced to an argument that competition
will lead to undesirable results in the market. 33 The policy question for
Americans is whether the principles of competition reflected in the Sherman
Act should apply to sports league restraints.
Historically, player restraints in baseball were held exempt from the
Sherman Act by judicial decree. Initially, this was based on an outmoded
view that competition among clubs for the services of baseball players did not
constitute interstate commerce.3 4 Then, the Court reaffirmed the exemption,
expressing concern with the retroactive application of the Sherman Act in light
of clubs' asserted reliance on the exemption, and the Court's preference that
the matter be resolved by Congress.35 Later, the exemption was reaffirmed
again, the Court noting that Congress had displayed "positive inaction" in
failing to subject baseball's reserve clause to antitrust scrutiny and implying
that the Court agreed with the owners that competition for player services
would ruin the game. 36 Finally, hhowever, this was overruled by the Curt Flood
Act of 1998,37 and thus major league baseball players can now bring an

antitrust action.
The recent statute simply puts baseball players on par with their
counterparts in other sports. Clubs can still seek to employ two other defenses
to avoid the reasonableness test of the Sherman Act. One is the "non-statutory
labor exemption," which holds that where players form a union, they cannot

31.
32.
69,982
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

Id.at 107.
Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976); McNeil v. NFL, 1992-2 Trade Cas. (CCH)
(D. Minn.) (jury verdict).
Nat'l Soc'y ofProfl Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
Fed. Baseball Club v. Nat'l League, 259 U.S. 200 (1922).
Toolson v. New York Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S. 356 (1953).
See Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972).
15 U.S.C. § 27a (2000).
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challenge a restraint that is a mandatory subject of bargaining under labor law,
even if restraint was imposed by owners (pursuant to labor law) over the
union's objection.3 8 While it remains unclear whether consumers or the
government could challenge a player restraint because of its adverse effect on
the quality of the product, the only way in which unionized players can take
39
advantage of the Sherman Act is to decertify as a union and file a lawsuit.
While this law now appears settled in the United States, because labor market
restraints can also significantly affect product quality - through the inefficient
allocation of players among teams, particularly via restraints that harm
competitive balance by making it more difficult for inferior teams to improve the public interest in competition ought only be sacrificed only when the
benefits of labor peace. are likely to be achieved.40 This narrowing of the
benefits of competition law in the area of player restraints need not be
followed elsewhere.4 '
Another possible argument the clubs may use to evade the requirements of
competition law is that clubs are so interdependent that they are more like
unincorporated divisions of a single corporation than competing entities.
Courts have never accepted this argument, and properly so. Leagues are
controlled by owners who vote for their own club's interest, rather than interest
of the league as a whole. Clubs compete for player services, and each club
retains its own profits and losses. Thus, leagues are properly treated as joint
ventures subject to competition law.
C.

European Community Law

Two provisions of the EU Treaty govern agreements among European
clubs that limit competition for player services. Article 48 prohibits
restrictions on the free movement of workers, while Article 81 prohibits
concerted practices that restrict competition. In Union Royale Belge des

38. Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231 (1996).
39. This is exactly what the NFLPA did in the 1990s, when it decertified and won a successful
antitrust case against NFL labor restraints. See Powell & McNeil v. NFL, 764 F. Supp. 1351, 1356
(D. Minn. 1991) (allowing players to proceed with antitrust challenge after decertifying union);
McNeil v. NFL, 1992-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 69,982 (D. Minn. 1992) (jury verdict in favor of
plaintiffs).
40. Ross & Locke, supra note 6.
41. There is no support in the common law of restraint of trade for the proposition that an
agreement among employers imposed without the consent of a union is reasonable simply because it
was imposed in the context of a process of collective bargaining. Nor is there a labor exemption
contained in European Union competition provisions. For a discussion of why the statutory labor
exemption in the Canadian Competition Act does not apply to unreasonable player restraints, see
Ross, NHL Labour Dispute,supra note 6.
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Socites de Football Association v. Bosman,4 2 the court held that Article 48
barred a rule that a club signing a player pay a transfer fee to his prior
employer. The Advocat General, employing the same analysis, also found the
restraint unlawful under Article 81. The court recognized that leagues had a
legitimate interest in competitive balance, but found the challenged restraint to
be overbroad. The court also recognized a legitimate interest in assuring that
previous employers were fairly compensated for training a player, but here too
found the challenged restraint to be overbroad.
As I have detailed elsewhere, 43 an across-the-board limit on player
mobility, that applies equally to transfers from lower-table financially poor
teams to European powerhouses as well as the reverse, is necessarily going to
be overbroad. As to recouping investment, it is unclear what sort of restraints
would meet this standard: a club investing in a young player can simply sign
the player to a multi-year contract to ensure training investments can be
recouped when the player's contract is sold.
D. CanadianCompetitionAct

44

Section 45 of the Competition Act prohibits agreements that lessen
competition unduly. Although this statute is similar in wording to section 1 of
the Sherman Act and Article 81 of the EU Treaty, it has been construed to bar
agreements among firms with the power to control the market even if
necessary to enhance a product's appeal. Accordingly, when the statute, which
previously applied only to the sale of goods, was extended in 1976 to cover
services, the National Hockey League succeeded in obtaining a partial
exemption. Instead of being governed by section 45, a special provision,
section 48, was enacted that prohibits sports leagues from lessening
The history of Canadian competition law
competition "unreasonably."
demonstrates that the parliamentary purpose was to apply the more flexible
standards of the common law to player restraints.45
42. [1996] 1 C.M.L.R. 645 (E.C.J.).
43. See Ross, MisunderstoodAlliance, supra note 6; Stephen F. Ross, Restraints on Player
Competition that FacilitateCompetitive Balance and PlayerDevelopment and their Legality in the
United States and Europe, in COMPETITION POLICY AND PROFESSIONAL SPORTS (Claude Jenrenaud

& Stefan K6senne eds. 1999).
44. The following is a summary of a detailed analysis contained in Ross, NHL Labour Dispute,
supra note 6.

45. A detailed analysis of the Australian Trade Practices Act's application to player restraint has
not been recently undertaken and is beyond the scope of this summary. See generally, Brian Ward,
FairPlay: ProfessionalSports andRestraint of Trade, 59 L. INST. J. 545 (1985). Australian law
generally prohibits corporations from agreeing with competitors where the purpose or effect is to
substantially lessen competition. Although a specific provision that exempts employment agreements
from the terms of the competition statute was initially thought to exempt player restraints from the
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NEW OPPORTUNITIES FOR COMPETITION LAW INTERVENTION

Labor restraints imposed by leagues with monopsony power can severely
exploit players by limiting competitive bids to amounts significantly below
what the market would bear. Moreover, as noted above, player restraints can
result in an inefficient allocation of players among clubs, harming consumers
by producing a result unresponsive to consumer demand. Three justifications
are often asserted for player restraints: (1) enhancing competitive balance; (2)
recovering club investment in player development; and (3) achieving "cost
certainty" for clubs. Most labor restraints are unnecessary to the first two
goals, and the third is not a legitimate one. Competition law, which bars
unnecessary restraints, can be employed more vigorously to protect consumers
and players against unnecessary labor restraints.
Salary caps and blanket restraints on signing veteran players whose
contracts have expired are not tailored to promote competitive balance.
Indeed, as noted above, these restraints may harm balance by inhibiting the
ability of poor teams to quickly improve. This inhibition is exacerbated in
North America where cash transfers are disfavored. A salary cap that restricts
the chronically disappointing Baltimore Orioles, or free agent restrictions that
prevent both the perennial Stanley Cup contending Detroit Red Wings and the
under-achieving New York Rangers from signing new players, demonstrate
why these restraints are overbroad. In contrast, consider the so-called
"Rooney Rule" in effect in the NFL for 1994 only: playoff teams could not
raise payroll, but all other teams were unrestrained; this restraint is narrowly
tailored to promote competitive balance.
As noted earlier, restraints have never been shown to be necessary to
protect investment in players. Any club making a substantial investment in the
training or development of a young player can sign the player to a multi-year
contract with the last year's terms at the option of the club. When the
penultimate contract year has finished, the club can seek to re-sign a blooming
player, or, if it lacks confidence it will be able to do so, the club can be
compensated for transferring the player's contract to another club willing to
come to terms on a new long-term arrangement.
The justification of "cost certainty," used recently in the National
Basketball Association and the National Hockey League, is simply not a
statute, in News Ltd v. Australian Rugby League, 139 A.L.R. 193, 343-43 (Full Fed. Ct. 1996), the
court suggested a loophole for players and others to challenge labor market restraints: if the player's
relationship with the club is not in the form of an employer's contract for the employee's services,
then the agreement is subject to the statute. On the other hand, if the league attempts to evade the
statute by insisting that all contracts be contracts for employee services, this itself is a potential
statutory violation.
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legitimate, pro-competitive goal for an established league. The rhetoric may
have originated in 1982 when the NBA's commissioner persuaded the players'
union to agree to a salary cap (thus exempting the cap from antitrust
challenge), in part based on the need to attract additional investment into a
game that was faltering. Absent viability-threatening circumstances, the desire
of owners to be certain of future costs is completely antithetical to
competition. Owners should be uncertain about their costs. In other
industries, firms whose poor business acumen results in an inferior product do
indeed have to spend more than their rivals to bring their goods or services up
to par. In sports, when front-office management make poor personnel or
coaching decisions that result in an inferior team on the field, they too should
be required to increase spending.
The system of promotion and relegation common in Europe does raise the
specter of financial insolvency if too many lower-tier teams spend sums of
money on players that will only be profitable if the club secures promotion to
the top tier. Maintaining the viability of lower-tier clubs might, therefore,
justify rules that limit the debt that clubs can incur. However, such rules must
focus on long-term debt and real threats to insolvency. A rule, for example,
that limited lower-tier club payrolls to a fixed percentage of revenue prevents
teams with a reasonable likelihood of promotion from spending an amount
reflecting that likelihood.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The common law of restraint of trade and the competition statutes of
major sporting nations all effectively use the same test for sports league
restraints. Under these legal regimes, courts ask first, whether the restraint
serves a legitimate interest, and second, whether the restraint is reasonably
necessary or overbroad. These similar approaches provide flexibility for
leagues to restrain player competition to promote competitive balance but not
to monopsonize market, a process which hurts other players through lower
salaries and fans, because of the inability of lousy teams subject to player
restraints to quickly improve.

